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1Abstract
This paper examines how FDA might respond to attempts by the U.S. military to oﬀer troops an exper-
imental, performance-enhancing drug or medical device to improve alertness, prevent fatigue, and obviate
the basic human need for sleep. This paper chronicles military performance enhancement throughout human
history, identiﬁes future approaches to military performance enhancement currently being pursued by the
American military, and examines the historical relationship between FDA and the military. Based on this
historical and policy background, this paper argues that the unique regulatory concerns raised by experi-
mental military performance enhancement technologies will create new strains on the relationship between
FDA and the American military.
Introduction
Imagine an American military populated by soldiers who never need to sleep, always stay alert, and never
feel fatigued. Special operations forces that can march 100 miles non-stop. Aviators who see the sun rise
and set multiple times between each takeoﬀ and landing. Submarine days that last 80 hours rather than
18. This scenario seems impossible at ﬁrst glance, a futurist fantasy along the lines of teleportation devices,
time travel and mental telepathy. However, the American military is not only imagining but is currently
developing drugs and medical devices that may make the ‘sleepless soldier’ a reality in the near future.
The recent controversies over ‘go-pills’ and the use of experimental bio-defense drugs have demonstrated
that FDA already faces a formidable task in regulating military applications of potentially dangerous drugs.
However, the new crop of experimental performance enhancement technologies likely will present even greater
diﬃculties for FDA when and if the Department of Defense decides to use or test them on troops in the ﬁeld.
2This paper will attempt to answer a somewhat ominous question: How might FDA respond to attempts
by the U.S. military to oﬀer troops an experimental, performance-enhancing drug or medical device to
improve alertness, prevent fatigue, and obviate the basic human need for sleep? This paper will approach
this question from the points of view of history, regulation, public policy and ethics. Part One sets out
the history of military performance enhancement, from the age of the Vikings through modern times. Part
Two will examine projects currently being sponsored by the American military that are seeking to develop
new technologies to boost troop performance in the ﬁeld. Part Three describes the regulatory and political
dimensions of the relationship between FDA and the military since the Second World War. Part Four
analyzes the regulatory concerns raised by experimental drugs with military applications, keeping in mind
FDA’s current capabilities and limitations.
I.
The History of Military Performance Enhancement
Throughout human history, societies have sought to gain every possible advantage over their adversaries
in battle. Tactics, manpower, position on the battleﬁeld and weaponry are the most obvious means of
achieving superiority in war. However, there are also numerous instances in which civilizations have employed
psychoactive drugs to enhance the alertness, stamina and bravery of their warriors.
3A. Military Use of Drugs Other Than Amphetamines
The amphetamine-based ‘go-pills’ currently oﬀered to American troops are only one of a panoply of phar-
macological compounds that have been used to boost performance in battle. The Germanic sagas and other
source materials from Northern Europe in the Middle Ages speak of a particularly fearless (and particularly
feared) class of warriors known as ‘berserks’ or ‘berserkers’:
’
They advanced without mail-coats, and were as frenzied as dogs or wolves; they bit their
shields; they were as strong as bears or boars; they struck men down, but neither ﬁre nor
steel could mark them. This was called the Berserk Rage.’1
Their apparent superhuman strength and intimidating demeanor made berserkers extremely valuable to
Scandinavian kings bent on achieving military superiority over their neighbors:
According to [a poet at Harald Fairhair’s court], Harald’s court included a company of
picked ﬁghters on whom he particularly relied—the berserks, also known as ‘wolf-skins’.
From many attests it appears that there was an aura of mystery and horror surrounding
such men....2
Until relatively recently, the true source of the ‘berserk rage’ remained mysterious. However, modern scholars
have posited a persuasive theory connecting the berserk rage to the ingestion of the amanita muscaria
mushroom, commonly known as the ﬂy agaric.3
The ﬂy agaric grows wildly throughout Siberia and Northern Europe and has been used as a socially-
acceptable intoxicant by indigenous peoples throughout the region since time immemorial. When consumed
by humans, this species of mushroom has a pronounced stimulant eﬀect:
3See Siri Melchior, On Going Berserk (June 5, 1967) (unpublished manuscript, on ﬁle with the Economic Botany Library
of Oakes Ames, Harvard Botanical Museum).
4A small dose (or the initial eﬀect of a larger one) causes bodily stimulation and a desire
for movement and physical exercise. Under its inﬂuence a Koryak man is reported to have
carried a 120 lb (some 53 kg) sack of ﬂour a distance of ten miles, something he would not
have been able to do normally.4
The strength and enthusiasm that the drug encourages would have been highly desirable attributes in a
warrior engaged in hand-to-hand combat, especially if he were facing a sober enemy. It is perhaps not
surprising, therefore, that the mushroom’s use by soldiers in the region even extended into the early 19th
century:
During a march of the Varmland troops in 1814, a Swedish oﬃcer noticed that some of his
men were under an attack of wild raging and that they were foaming at the mouth. An
investigation disclosed that these soldiers had eaten ﬂy agaric to put themselves in a good
ﬁghting mood.5
While we will likely never know for certain whether the berserk rage was truly brought on by ﬂy
agaric mushrooms, the evidence for the connection is quite persuasive. The mushrooms grow wild
in regions that were once inhabited by the Vikings, they saw widespread civilian use throughout
the region, and the eﬀects of the drug bear an uncanny resemblance to extant accounts of berserker
behavior.
While the berserkers present the most striking historical example of performance enhancing drugs employed in
a military context, the general practice was far more widespread, both geographically and pharmacologically.
Thus, in his account of a journey to Constantinople in 1610, the English poet George Sandys observed: ‘The
Turkes are also incredible takers of Opium...carrying it about them both in peace and in warre; which
they say expelleth all feare, and maketh them courageous....”’6 While opium has been used generally as
a painkiller, Sandys’ account suggests that Turkish warriors actually ingested the drug before battle rather
than afterwards. While the stimulant eﬀects of the ﬂy agaric no doubt provided a greater enhancement
6Richard Davenport-Hines, The Pursuit of Oblivion: A Global History of Narcotics 1500-2000, at 12 (2001).
5to warriors’ prowess in battle, the military value of having such a ‘fearless’ and ‘courageous’ ﬁghting force
should not be underestimated.
The coca plant, indigenous to South America and familiar to pre-Columbian civilizations, particularly the
Incas, provides another example of military performance enhancement. When chewed, the leaves of the coca
plant act as a stimulant: “[coca] alkaloids act directly on the central nervous system to alleviate hunger,
thirst and fatigue....”7 Chewing coca seems to have been as commonplace among the Inca as tobacco use
is in contemporary Western society—its ingestion was not restricted to religious or recreational contexts.8
Although it is diﬃcult to establish for certain that Inca warriors actually chewed coca in battle, it would
not require a great logical leap to assume so. It has been observed that “[t]he Spanish invaders [exploited
the] stimulating eﬀects [of coca] to increase the work capacity of their Inca slaves, whom they forced to mine
gold.”9 The Conquistadors certainly had some basis for their realization that the plant provided a valuable
means of improving the productivity of the Incas whom they had conquered. Assuming the Conquistadors
learned of the stimulant eﬀects of coca by observing Incas using the drug in their everyday lives, it is more
likely than not that its usage had extended into the military context in the pre-Columbian period.
Finally, the unexpurgated lyrics of the well-known Mexican folksong, La Cucaracha, which was originally
a Zapatista marching song, attests to the use of marijuana among Mexican soldiers during the Mexican
Revolution:
La cucaracha, la cucaracha The cockroach, the cockroach
7Id. at 138.
8See id.
9Id. at 138.
6Ya no puede caminar; Can no longer walk,
porque no tiene, porque le falta Because he hasn’t, because he hasn’t
Marihuana que fumar. Marijuana to smoke.10
Zapatista soldiers were referred to in the Mexican slang of the time as “cockroaches.” This stanza suggests
that the Zapatista soldiers smoked marijuana to combat fatigue on long marches. These four examples, from
widely disparate times and places, demonstrate that military performance enhancement through chemistry
is not a new or novel idea.
B. Amphetamines in Combat
Amphetamine (betaphenylisopropylamine) was ﬁrst identiﬁed in 1910 and was ﬁrst synthesized and marketed
as a decongestant under the trade name Benzedrine in 1932.11 However, there is evidence suggesting that ma
huang, an herb containing the stimulant ephedrine—which has been known in Chinese medicine for centuries
and was the subject of recent controversy for its use as a dietary supplement in the United States—may
have been used by soldiers to keep them awake while performing night watch duties along the Great Wall.12
In Western countries, amphetamines—particularly Dexedrine (dextramphetamine sulfate)—have been used
to combat fatigue among soldiers since the middle of the 20th century.13 During the Second World War, after
10See Frances Toor, A Treasury of Mexican Folkways 310, 413-14 (DATE).
11See Davenport-Hines, supra note 6, at 241.
12See Richard Martin, It’s Wake-Up Time, Wired, Nov. 2003 [available at:
www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.11/sleep pr.html]; see also Arthur C. Gibson, Ma Huang: An An-
cient Chinese Stimulant in Writeups and illustrations of economically important plants [available at:
http://www.botgard.ucla.edu/html/botanytextbooks/economicbotany/Ephedra/]
13Performance Maintenance During Continuous Flight Operations: A Guide for Flight Surgeons
(NAVMED P-6410), Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Jan. 1, 2000, at 8; see also GlaxoSmithkline, Prescribing Infor-
mation for Dexedrine [available at: us.gsk.com/products/assets/us dexedrine.pdf].
7a German pilot who had been shot down was found to be carrying amphetamine tables, the British Royal
Air Force began issuing the drug to its own pilots. By the end of the war, British troops—including aviators,
sailors and infantrymen—had been issued a total of 72 million amphetamine tablets, while American troops
consumed even greater quantities of the drug.14 Consumption of amphetamines by American soldiers nearly
doubled during the Vietnam War.15 As will be discussed in greater detail, infra, today Dexedrine tablets,
euphemistically referred to as ‘go pills,’ are still made available to American combat pilots and, most likely,
to special operations forces, as well.16
Until 1957, the sanctioned use of amphetamines by American and European soldiers ﬁt squarely into the
long, worldwide tradition of military performance enhancement outlined, supra. The Vikings’ ﬂy agaric,
the Incas’ coca, the Turks’ opium and the Mexicans’ marijuana were all generally accepted for use by the
civilian population in the societies that produced these enhanced warriors. Similarly, during the ﬁrst decades
of amphetamine production, there was little stigma attached to its use. It was neither unusual nor untoward
for world leaders, respected intellectuals and suburban housewives alike to take amphetamines on a regular
basis.17
However, dramatic changes in social mores and government regulation of drugs during the late 1950s distin-
guish the more recent use of amphetamines by the military from its historical precursors. In 1957, troubled
by the increasing recreational use and abuse of amphetamines, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics classiﬁed
amphetamines as Schedule II controlled substances, meaning that this class of drugs had a high potential
14See Davenport-Hines, supra note 6, at 241.
15See id.
16See Brad Knickerbocker, Military Looks to Drugs for Battle Readiness, The Christian Science Monitor 1 (Aug. 9,
2002).
17See Davenport-Hines at 242-45.
8for addiction, although it also had legitimate medical uses.18 This classiﬁcation placed restrictions on the
distribution and prescription of amphetamines and contributed to a general sense of social stigma except
where it was used to fulﬁll a legitimate therapeutic purpose.19
Even before 1957, the military use of amphetamines in America and Europe can be distinguished from earlier
instances of pharmacological performance enhancement. In general, it seems that warriors who took drugs
to bolster their ﬁghting capabilities did so of their own volition, without any centralized military authority
endorsing or requiring their use. For example, the berserkers were a small class of warriors who likely fought
alongside entirely sober compatriots—berserk rage was not a requirement for service. There is even evidence
that, although Viking rulers considered berserkers a valuable military tool, their continual ingestion of ﬂy
agaric mushrooms—both in peacetime and in war—was sometimes seen as a nuisance.20 This love/hate
relationship between berserkers and their lieges suggests that the use of ﬂy agaric was not required and that
sometimes public policy actually counseled against encouraging its use, notwithstanding its strategic value.
The accounts of the use of drugs by Incan, Turkish and Mexican forces similarly evidence that soldiers were
not commanded by their superiors to use drugs in battle: individual warriors simply did so as a matter of
course on the basis of a wholly personal decision.
While the issue of required use of stimulants will be examined, infra, in the context of informed consent, as
a general matter amphetamine use was the product of centralized military policy. During the Second World
War, the French, German and American militaries all provided amphetamine tablets to their respective
troops—whether they wanted them or not. British aviators during the war felt a certain level of discomfort
with the new performance enhancing drug they were being given:
18See Davenport-Hines, supra note 6, at 246; see also Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.S. § 812 (1996).
19See 21 U.S.C.S. § 821.
20See Simpson, supra note 1, at 153.
9‘
Pilots as a class,’ reported an RAF medical oﬃcer, ‘did not like being doped, and there was
a rather well-marked feeling in the Air Force against improvements in performance being
obtained by what seemed to the men to be rather “phoney” [sic] means.’21
This resistance may have been more a product of ﬂyboy machismo than wariness about the eﬀects of the
chemical compound itself. Nevertheless, the important point is that, even though RAF pilots felt uneasy
about “being doped” and may have preferred to test their skills while sober, they likely ingested a signiﬁcant
number of the 72 million Dexedrine tablets consumed by British forces during the war. Some other motivating
factor must have been at work, with top-down institutional pressure to take the drugs being the most likely
candidate. Similarly, while modern American aviators are not required to take ‘go pills,’ they likely feel
signiﬁcant pressure to do so by merit of the fact that the drugs are being supplied by superiors under the
rubric of general military policy, rather than their being used in a more decentralized fashion, with individual
soldiers acquiring the drugs from sources outside the military, as has been the usual pattern for drug use
among warriors throughout human history.
II.
The Role of DARPA in Developing New Means of Military Performance En-
hancement
The history of military performance enhancement will not end with amphetamines. The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Defense Department agency primarily responsible for cutting-edge
military research, is currently exploring new technologies, pharmacological and otherwise, to keep soldiers
awake and alert.
In response to the 1958 launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union, Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense
10to develop a regime for conducting basic and applied research in the ﬁeld of military technology.22 DARPA,
then know as the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), was designed to operate independently of the
three branches of the Armed Services.23 Today, DARPA still enjoys “substantial autonomy and freedom from
bureaucratic impediments.”24 According to Department of Defense Directive 5134.10, which implements to
Congressional mandate by establishing guidelines for DARPA, the Director of the agency reports directly to
the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology Logistics, with the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering serving as DARPA’s “Principal Staﬀ Assistant.”25 DARPA’s mission is to “serve as the
central research and development organization of the Department of Defense with a primary responsibility
to maintain U.S. technological superiority over potential adversaries.”26 DARPA is a relatively small agency
with an operating budget in FY2003 of $2.6 billion.27 Not surprisingly, therefore, instead of conducting
its own internal research projects, DARPA personnel perform a pure oversight function, awarding research
funding to outside contractors in industry and academia.28 Although DARPA does consider the potential
commercialization of research for civilian use, its primary function is “conducting long-range, high-risk
research and development (R&D) for advanced technologies that contribute to national security needs.”29
In DARPA’s view, warriors with superhuman physical capabilities are the wave of the future. In the words
of a recent report by the agency to Congress, “DARPA’s approach is to imagine what a military commander
22See An Act to authorize the Secretary of the Air Force to establish and develop certain installations for the national
security, and to confer certain authority on the Secretary of Defense, and for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 85-325, § 7 (1958);
see also U.S. Congress, Oﬃce of Technology Assessment, Defense Conversion: Redirecting R&D, OTA-ITE-552, at 122
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oﬃce, May 1993).
23See Defense Conversion at 122.
24DARPA website, DARPA Over the Years [available at: www.darpa.mil/body/overtheyears.html].
25See Dep’t of Def. Directive 5134.10, § 4, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Feb. 17, 1995 (Certiﬁed
Current as of Nov. 21, 2003); see also, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Strategic Plan, 2-3 (Feb. 2003) [available
at www.darpa.mil].
26Dep’t of Def. Directive 5134.10, at § 3.
27Dep’t of Def., Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Estimates, at D-25 (2002) [available at:
http://www.darpa.mil/body/pdf/FY03BudEst.pdf]
28See Dep’t of Def. Directive 5134.10 at § E1.1.1.13; see also Defense Conversion, supra note 22, at 139.
29Defense Conversion at 121.
11would want in the future, and then accelerate that future into being.”30 As retired Rear. Adm. Stephen
Baker, a former Navy chief of operational testing and evaluation, has declared, “‘[t]his “better warrior
through chemistry” ﬁeld is being looked at very closely.”’31
Of the myriad ‘technical oﬃces’ established under the DARPA umbrella to carry out the agency’s broad
objectives, the Defense Sciences Oﬃce (DSO) is the division responsible for investigations into performance
enhancement technologies:
The Defense Sciences Oﬃce mission is to vigorously pursue the most promising discoveries
and innovations in science and engineering to create paradigm shifts in defense capabilities.
DSO emphasizes programs in medical approaches to biological warfare defense, biology,
materials and advanced mathematics.32
In recent years, DSO has been focusing on the development of what it calls “Enhanced Human Performance”
technologies “aimed at preventing humans from becoming the weakest link in the military.”33 In addition
to numerous technologies beyond the scope of this paper, DARPA has initiated a “Continuous Assisted
Performance program” which “is investigating ways to prevent fatigue and enable soldiers to stay awake,
alert, and eﬀective for up to seven days straight without suﬀering any deleterious mental or physical eﬀects
and without using any of the current generation of stimulants.”34 This initiative falls under the DSO
objective to develop “medical approaches to...biology.” DARPA hopes that the fruits of this research will
eﬀect a complete change in the way America ﬁghts wars, providing a marked advantage in combating less
technologically-advanced adversaries.35 Further, while ‘go pill’ usage in recent years has likely been conﬁned
to aviators and, perhaps, special operations forces, DARPA believes that the tactical beneﬁts of alertness are
30See DARPA, Strategic Plan 2-3 (Feb. 2003).
31See Knickerbocker, supra note 16.
33DARPA Strategic Plan at 18.
34Id.
35DARPA Defense Sciences Oﬃce, Preventing Sleep Deprivation. [available at: www.darpa.mil/dso/thrust/biosci/cap.htm]
(““Eliminating the need for sleep during an operation, while maintaining the high level of both cognitive and physical per-
formance of the individual, will create a fundamental change in warﬁghting and force employment...In short, the capability
to operate eﬀectively, without sleep, is no less than a 21st century revolution in military aﬀairs that results in operational
dominance across the whole range of potential U.S. military employments.”)
12of such a general nature that “this advantage is not restricted by Service roles and missions.”36 Therefore,
it seems reasonable to conclude that any useful technologies that resulted from this initiative would likely
ﬁnd widespread use throughout the ranks.
Considering the secrecy of these projects and DARPA’s long-term approach to research, it is not surprising
that the agency is somewhat vague about the speciﬁcs of their performance enhancement research: “[t]hese
approaches will capitalize on emerging concepts in neuroscience, neurobiology, cognitive psychology, cell
signaling/regulation, noninvasive imaging technologies, and novel mathematical approaches to modeling and
analysis.”37 Nevertheless, the details that DARPA has made public are suﬃcient to paint a somewhat
frightening picture of the future of performance enhancement. Speciﬁcally, there are two general means
of performance enhancement that DARPA seems to be exploring: powerful new psychoactive drugs and a
medical device that would operate on the brain to ‘zap’ soldiers into alertness.
A. Traditional Pharmacological Approaches to Performance En-
hancement
The most obvious way to move beyond “the current generation of stimulants” is to design a new generation
of stimulants.38 This is at least one objective of current DARPA research. Developing substances that can
keep a soldier awake for up to seven days at a time, “would actually involve much more than the ‘linear,
incremental and...limited’ approaches of stimulants like caﬀeine and amphetamines.”39 Suﬃce it to say that
36Id.
37Id.
38See Knickerbocker, supra note 16.
39Knickerbocker, supra note 16.
13it is likely that DARPA is investigating the possibilities of new compounds that would not be classiﬁable as
amphetamines—or any other class of drugs currently available. Further, considering the far more pronounced
eﬀects on human physiology that DARPA hopes to achieve, it is not outside the realm of possibility that
any such compound might have commensurately pronounced side eﬀects.
B. Non-Pharmacological Approaches to Performance Enhance-
ment
Apparently, at least some of the focus of DARPA research is focused on non-pharmacological medical devices,
rather than drugs.40 For example, Yaakov Stern, a neurologist at Columbia University who is being funded
by DARPA, is attempting to develop an electromagnetic device that would “zap” soldiers into alertness.41
The idea of using any sort of ‘ray gun’ that would have a pronounced eﬀect on the human brain should
probably raise red ﬂags about the potential for cancer, strokes, brain damage and cell mutation.
III. FDA’s Role in Regulating New Performance Enhancement Technologies
The regulatory concerns raised by DARPA’s current attempts to develop new means of military performance
enhancement lie at an intersection between the two recent controversies over go-pills and experimental
40See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (“The term ‘device’...means an instrument...intended to aﬀect the structure or any function of
the body of man or other animals”); see also United States v. 23...Articles, 192 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding that even a
phonograph record intended to alleviate insomnia constitutes a medical device under § 321(h)).
41Charles Laurence, Ready for war in 2005: the soldier who never sleeps, Sunday Telegraph (London) (Jan. 6, 2003) at
26.
14protections against biological and chemical weapons. This section will examine the strategies that FDA has
employed in the past to regulate food and drugs for military use. In addition, this section will demonstrate
how the realities of an executive branch composed of agencies with disparate policy objectives and diﬀering
levels of political clout has complicated recent attempts by FDA to regulate potentially dangerous innovations
that might, nevertheless, bolster our national security.42
A.
The Historical Relationship Between FDA and the Military
Throughout the 20th Century, the relationship between FDA and the Department of Defense has been
characterized by a conﬂict of institutional cultures, policy objectives and political clout:
An agency [FDA] designed to regulate a relatively decentralized part of the private sector
found itself in competition (and often conﬂict) with much larger governmental agencies with
radically diﬀerent goals. Furthermore, the regulated industries sought to ally themselves
with these competing governmental patrons and to resist FDA’s control.43
FDA’s ﬁght for regulatory control over food and drugs used in a military context has always been an uphill
battle due to the basic characteristics of the agency: it is small, its Comissioner serves at the pleasure of
the President rather than for a ﬁxed term, the agency has always been subordinated under the umbrella of
one or another Cabinet-level department, and it must continually combat a historical tendency to err on the
side of national security, especially when the nation is at war.44 FDA has only been successful in playing
42My analysis of the ‘go-pills’ and bio-defense controversies builds upon three past papers in Prof. Barton Hutt’s Food and
Drug Law class at Harvard Law School. See Matthew A. Hoﬀman, The Military’s Need for “Speed”: A Case Study On the
FDA’s Regulation of Oﬀ-Label Prescriptions (2003) [available at: http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/534/Hoﬀman.pdf];
see also Christopher J. Lovrien, Investigational Drug Use Among the Troops: The Waiver of Informed Consent in Cases
of Military Combat Exigencies (1997) [available at: http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/164/clovrien.pdf]; see also Brenda
Jarrell, FDA Regulation and the Military: Is There a Compromise in the Battle over Investigational Drugs? (1997) [available
at: http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/335/Brenda Herschbach Jarrell.pdf].
44See id. at 456-59.
15David to the Department of Defense’s Goliath due to its highly dedicated and capable staﬀ, its success at
maintaining “a high degree of credibility and respect,” and its secure position on the moral high ground as
the protector of the general public against dangerous foods and drugs.45
Interaction between FDA and the Department of Defense has been contentious due to the agencies’ conﬂicting
policy goals. FDA maintains its administrative legitimacy because the regulation of food and drugs in the
interest of protecting the public is “a classic and proper exercise of the police power” and implements
Congress’ Constitutional mandate to regulate goods that travel in interstate commerce.46 By contrast, the
military derives its authority to win wars at all costs from an arguably more basic public policy interest
in “provid[ing] for the common defense,” preserving the whole of American society when it is faced with a
military threat to its very existence.47
At the outbreak of the Second World War, Commissioner Campbell wrote that “the Food and Drug Admin-
istration can best serve the national emergency by redoubling our eﬀorts to enforce the law, particularly as
it applies to foods and drugs purchased and used by public agencies.”48 This expression of FDA’s approach
to regulation in wartime demonstrates the diﬃculty of positing a politically persuasive argument for the
subordination of military eﬀorts to FDA regulation. On one hand, Commissioner Campbell’s statement ex-
presses a desire to protect America’s troops from dangerous foods and drugs by “redoubling” its enforcement
eﬀorts. On the other hand, however, conﬂict is inevitable where FDA focuses its regulatory microscope on
the purchasing activities of other “public agencies.”
Many instances have arisen in which FDA enforcement would have served as a hindrance to military objec-
45See id. at 456-61.
46Id. at 462; see also Hipolite Egg Company v. U.S., 220 U.S. 45 (1911); see also U.S. Const. art. I. § 8, cl. 3.
47See U.S. Const. pmbl., art. I. § 8.
48See Dean, supra note 43, at 470.
16tives. Therefore, FDA has had to ‘choose its battles’ in the interest of maintaining its institutional legitimacy.
During the Second World War, FDA engaged extensively in compromises with the military, conserving its
regulatory powers for only those situations where the danger to the health of soldiers and/or civilians was
most acute.
More often than not, FDA sought compromise, even when doing so ran contrary to the agency’s stated mis-
sion: “[o]n occasion FDA chose a tactical retreat to preserve their new alliances with the military services.”49
For example, FDA relaxed ﬁlth standards for certain processed foods for the duration of the conﬂict as a con-
cession to the realities of wartime strains on production.50 And yet, those relaxations were never announced
to the public.51 This policy of reticence regarding relaxed standards that could not be avoided could be
interpreted as an attempt by FDA to preserve its political capital while yielding to interagency pressures
to weaken, rather than “redouble,” its regulatory activities. On another occasion, FDA relaxed its labeling
requirements for military packaging of an otic solution.52 FDA also agreed not to contest the military’s use
of a then unapproved anti-malarial, quinine, so long as the dosage remained at a minimal level.53 Similarly,
FDA took a pragmatic approach to the diﬃcult problem of setting standards for the production of penicillin.
Faced with urgent wartime need for the nascent antibiotic, FDA relaxed its dating requirements for the drug
so long as the Army took responsibility for developing adequate procedures for preserving the delicate new
drug.54
But, indeed, FDA did occasionally use its regulatory authority during the conﬂict to deny approval to the
military—for example, regarding a nutrient-fortiﬁed candy bar proposed as a military ration—where the
49Id. at 481
50See id.
51See id.
52See id.
53See id. at 495-96 (“When faced with more than one scientiﬁc viewpoint and less wartime urgency, the policymaking process
used for quinine likely would prove less successful.”).
54See id. at 497-98.
17argument could be made that approval would have made only a negligible contribution to winning the
war.55 In another example of FDA-military conﬂict, the War Department sought to be exempted from the
FDCA’s labeling requirements for all food products being supplied to the troops. While FDA “was in no
position to force the military to follow the agency’s advice,” the agency succeeded in avoiding a blanket
exemption, which it feared might compromise the civilian food supply, by entering into a dialogue with the
War Department about its speciﬁc needs.56
FDA’s restrained approach in its relationship with the military proved to be a successful strategy, such that
“[b]y war’s end, FDA had won the conﬁdence of the armed services.” That conﬁdence was built on a largely
pragmatic approach to wartime regulation that has continued to prevail in recent years: while FDA does
not always bend to the wishes of the military, it understands that the exigencies of the battleﬁeld may make
the stringency of peacetime regulation impractical and undesireable, except in the most severe instances of
danger to soldiers. Therefore, FDA has continually worked with the military to fashion regulatory solutions
that maintain the basic policy aims and authority of FDA without tying the hands of the Department of
Defense.
On one hand, FDA’s historical approach to regulation in the face of speciﬁc military needs seems almost
inevitable. Without any guarantees that its directives will be followed by a military bent on achieving
every possible advantage on the battleﬁeld, FDA has been forced to compromise, contenting itself with the
preservation of the outward appearance of its authority in instances where a conservative regulatory stance
might simply be ignored by the armed services. However, while it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd fault with this overarching
55See id. at 474.
56See id. at 479-80.
18system of interagency cooperation and compromise, we can still question the wisdom of FDA’s actions in
individual cases by conducting a cost/beneﬁt analysis. To properly carry out its regulatory mission, FDA
should only relax its standards in instances where the material beneﬁt of an FDA concession to the war
eﬀort outweighs the attendant risks. Further, these risks could take multiple forms: risks to the health of
the individual soldier, risks to the safety of those around him, and strategic risks to the war eﬀort due to
some unforeseen and debilitating side eﬀect that an under-regulated food or drug might have.
For the most part, FDA decisions to under-regulate certain products during World War II were proven,
in hindsight, to have been wise decisions. Penicillin was a godsend to military doctors treating battleﬁeld
wounds and likely saved innumerable lives and limbs. Similarly, it is likely that quinine did more good than
harm for troops ﬁghting in the insect-infested tropical climate of the southern Paciﬁc Theater. However,
when we apply this cost/beneﬁt calculus to more recent concessions by FDA to the military during the
Gulf War and in Afghanistan—in the context of ‘go pills’ and bio-defense drugs—that calculus does not
necessarily come out in favor of under-regulation.
B. ‘ Go Pills’
During the 2002 military operations in Afghanistan, American aviators mistakenly attacked a Canadian
unit in the ﬁeld, killing four soldiers and injuring eight more.57 Some critics argued that this tragic error
in judgment was linked to the government-sanctioned practice of aviators taking amphetamines, an FDA-
approved but controlled substance, in order to remain alert and awake during long sorties, which are often
conducted at night. Although amphetamines are not experimental drugs, the manner in which they were
57See Knickerbocker, supra note 16.
19made available to American troops involved arguably inadequate practitioner safeguards for their oﬀ-label
prescription. For example, according to NAVMED protocols, ﬂight surgeons can “issue” stimulants, including
Dexedrine, to pilots in “amounts required for one or two ﬂights.”58 However, the ﬂight surgeon does not
examine pilots before ‘prescribing’ the pills for a particular mission.59 Instead, “ground testing” is done on
a day prior to distribution of the pills—and that testing must occur on a day when no ﬂying will actually
take place.60 The NAVMED guidelines are self-contradictory about what happens to unused pills after a
mission is completed: although the ﬂight surgeon is directed to “[c]ollect unused medication at the end of
continuous operations[,]” he is also permitted to dispense enough ‘go pills’ for “two ﬂights.”61 The careful
but contradictory wording of these guidelines suggests an attempt to whitewash the realities of a process
that looks far more like over-the-counter use than oﬀ-label prescription use.62
In addition, the administration of amphetamines to soldiers raises a more general question about the ethics
of using drugs for performance enhancement rather than for therapy. Just because our society has the ability
to keep soldiers awake for days does not mean that we should exploit that capability. The military’s general
approach to this criticism is to characterize ‘go pill’ usage as a therapy that is merely bringing tired pilots
up to a baseline level of performance. This is evident in the terminology that the NAVMED guidelines
employ, referring to “performance maintenance” rather than “performance enhancement.” However, the
58See NAVMED Guide for Flight Surgeons, supra note 13, at 14.
59See id.
60See id.
61See id.
62Section 353(b) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act declares that “habit forming substances” as deﬁned by §352(d)—
which includes amphetamines—can only be administered with a written prescription. Because Dexedrine is only indicated for
limited therapeutic purposes, including the treatment of narcolepsy and attention deﬁcit disorder, prescription of this substance
to prevent fatigue—the purpose for which the drug is being used in the military—is considered an oﬀ-label prescription. See
Prescribing Information for Dexedrine, supra note 13, at 2. The intent of the prescription regime is to put adequate safeguards—
the supervision of a qualiﬁed medical practitioner—on the use of dangerous drugs, while allowing doctors the ﬂexibility to
prescribe the drug on a case-by-case basis for reasons beyond the four corners of its approved indications. By reducing ﬂight
surgeon supervision to such a minimal level, the Navy and the rest of the armed services are trying to enjoy the beneﬁts of
oﬀ-label ﬂexibility while ﬂouting the safeguards of the prescription regime, which is meant to curtail unfettered use of potentially
dangerous drugs.
20truth of the matter is that the modern military services demand superhuman performance from airmen. The
problem is that the logical conclusion to be drawn from this line of reasoning—that American aviators are
being overworked, that perhaps we ask too much from our pilots—is incompatible with the perceived tactical
requirements for mounting a successful military campaign. As was often the case during the Second World
War, FDA has not stepped in to regulate the ‘go pill’ regime because to do so would likely put the military
in an untenable position, basically forcing the Pentagon to ignore the regulatory authority of FDA, which
would impair the future possibilities of coexistence between the two agencies.
C.
Drugs to Guard Against Chemical and Biological Attacks
During the 1990 Gulf War, American soldiers were forced to take experimental drugs—pyridostigmine bro-
mide and botulinum toxoid—that had not yet been approved by FDA as the military sought to protect
them from potential chemical and biological threats.63 In recent years, it has been suggested that these
experimental treatments may have contributed to Gulf War Syndrome.64
Unlike Dexedrine, which has at least been approved by FDA and has therefore been subject to post-market
surveillance for decades, the bio-defense drugs the military sought to dispense to combat forces were still
investigational new drugs (IND). FDA takes very seriously the use of untested drugs on humans, as evi-
denced by its demanding, multiphase clinical trial system. 65 Therefore, because military objectives were
63See Alida Milner, Gulf War Guinea Pigs: Is Informed Consent Optional During War?, 13 J. Contemp. Health L. &
Pol’y 199, 223 (1996).
64See Robyn Pforr Ryan, Should Combat Troops be Given the Option of Refusing Investigational Drug Treatment, 52 Food
Drug L.J. 377, 378 (1997).
65See The Food And Drug Administration’s Process for Approving New Drugs: Report of the Subcomm. on Science, Research
and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th Cong. (1980) in Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A.
Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 514-516 (1991).
21incompatible with the parameters of the IND regime, FDA had to take action in order to preserve, at least
ostensibly, the integrity of the entire regulatory framework. Section 355 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
sets out an extensive and stringent application procedure for INDs: “[n]o person shall introduce or deliver
for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application...us eﬀective
with respect to such drug.”66 However, in certain instances, the potential beneﬁts of immediate access to a
particular IND may greatly outweigh the attendant risks of pre-approval use. In such instances, FDA has
allowed an exemption from these requirements, when the investigation is conducted by “experts qualiﬁed by
scientiﬁc training and experience” and the experts obtain ‘informed consent’ from their subjects.67
In requesting an exemption for the administration of these two bio-defense agents, the Department of De-
fense asserted that “‘special military exigencies sometimes must supersede normal rights and procedures that
apply in the civilian community.”’68 In response, FDA crafted a regulation allowing an exception to the
informed consent requirement in the rare instance where obtaining informed consent was “not feasible.”69
Subsequently, FDA Commissioner Kessler waived the informed consent requirement for the bio-defense vac-
cination program pursuant to the new non-feasibility exception.70
This act by FDA is in line with its generally conciliatory approach in dealing with the military since the
Second World War. However, the possibility that the administration of these experimental drugs contributed
to gulf war syndrome suggests that this is an instance where the case-speciﬁc cost/beneﬁt calculus might
have been wrong. American military personnel were not subject to chemical or biological attacks during the
6621 U.S.C. § 355(a).
6721 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1), (3).
68See Milner, supra note 61, at 224 (quoting letter from the Assistant Sec. of Def. (Health Aﬀairs) to the Assistant Sec. of
Health for HHS).
69See 21 C.F.R. 50.23(a) (1995); see also Milner, supra note 61, at 226 n 186.
70See Milner at 226.
22Gulf War. Therefore, at least in hindsight, there was no real military risk to speak of. However, we are now
seeing that there may have been an enormous health risk to the individual soldiers who were forced to take
the experimental drugs.
IV. FDA Regulation and the Next Generation of Military Performance En-
hancement Technologies
In general, recent scholarship on the relationship between FDA and the military has focused on either
‘go pills’ or the experimental vaccine regime, but has not considered both controversies in conjunction.71
Because current DARPA research into new experimental techniques for performance enhancement implicates
regulatory and policy concerns raised by both controversies, it is useful to take a new, hybrid approach when
examining this potential area of FDA/military interaction.
DARPA has made it clear that they are experimenting with anti-fatigue technologies—both drugs and
medical devices—that heretofore have not been approved by FDA, and it is not outside the realm of possibility
that the Pentagon might some day ask FDA for an exemption allowing for their pre-approval use in combat.
While the practical application of these technologies would be the same as for ‘go pills,’ they would still
be experimental. Therefore, the regulatory concerns are slightly diﬀerent from those that have arisen in
the context of ‘go pills.’ These hypothetical compounds would not be prescribed oﬀ-label. Rather, the
experimental technologies would more closely resemble the experimental vaccines and bio-defense INDs that
received an exemption from FDA during the Gulf War.
71For a study of the policy and regulatory implications of the “go pills” controversy, see Hoﬀman, supra note 41. For
scholarship on the informed consent requirement as it relates to the mandatory use in the military of experimental bio-defense
drugs, see Lovrien, supra note 41; see also Alida Milner, Gulf War Guinea Pigs: Is Informed Consent Optional During War?,
13 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 199 (1996); see also Suzanne B. Seftel, Justiciability: Waiving for the Flag: Should
Informed Consent Rules Apply in the Context of Military Emergencies?, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1387 (1992); see also Ryan,
supra note 62; see also Natashia Tidwell, Soldiers of Misfortune: The Justiciability of Injunctive Relief Actions in the Federal
Courts and the U.S. Military’s Mandatory Anthrax Inoculation Program, 37 New. Eng. L. Rev. 429 (2003).
23At the same time, because these technologies are intended to eﬀect performance enhancement rather than to
protect against the threat of biological and chemical attacks, the informed consent issue becomes far murkier
than it was regarding experimental vaccines before the Gulf War. First, the Pentagon could argue that there
is no need for a waiver of informed consent because ingesting ‘go pills’ is entirely voluntary. However, the
realities of the ‘go pill’ procedure are such that aviators already feel a strong institutional pressure to take the
pills: sorties have become so long and frequent that the job makes superhuman demands on pilots. Military
personnel who refuse to take ‘go pills’ might be incapable of achieving an adequate level of performance,
endangering their fellow soldiers and themselves, and likely running the risk of being grounded by their
commanding oﬃcers. Therefore, FDA could certainly argue that a waiver of informed consent would be
required.
However, the new generation of ‘go pills’ and ‘go devices’ would change the
‘combat exigency’ calculus. FDA would have greater diﬃculty justifying such
a waiver because fatigue borne of an overly grueling combat schedule is not as
persuasive a combat exigency as the risk of chemical attacks was before the Gulf
War. These are not technologies intended to protect American troops from some
horrifying weapon that our enemies might use in a combat situation. Instead,
these are technologies intended to enhance performance. While it might be
argued that American soldiers will be at greater risk of death in combat without
these new technologies, this is a far weaker policy argument for an exemption
than that posited in preparation for the Gulf War.
Based on the pattern of past interactions between FDA and the military, it is reasonable to conclude that
FDA would ﬁnd some way to justify any exemption from IND requirements that the Pentagon might request
for the next generation of experimental performance enhancement technologies. The Gulf War vaccination
24program demonstrates that the Pentagon seems intent on giving its troops every tactical advantage while
they are in combat, even if those advantages are distinctly disadvantageous to the long-term health of
American servicemen. However, whatever FDA regulators privately think about the ‘supersoldier’ of the
future, any attempt to materially change military policy would likely result in the Pentagon simply ﬂouting
FDA regulatory control. FDA would have only one recourse in order to fulﬁll its philosophical stance that
“‘[t]he people who are in the armed forces are entitled to the protection which they ordinarily enjoy as
citizens.”’72 In a word: publicity. FDA has an incredibly powerful reserve of moral authority, which it
could leverage by making noisy protestations in the news media about the reckless Pentagon’s plans to
endanger the lives of the men and women who work daily to secure freedom for all Americans. The elected
oﬃcials—the president and Congress—who oversee the activities of the Department of Defense might take
heed and apply pressure internally on Pentagon oﬃcials to take a more conservative approach and curtail
their aspirations to create a ‘supersoldier.’
Conclusion
DARPA’s performance enhancement initiative is only one example of the Pentagon’s growing interest in
ﬁnding military applications for experimental drugs and medical devices.73 Advances in drug development
and biotechnology suggest that, in the future, the Department of Defense will have an even wider array of
technologies to choose from, placing increasingly greater demands on FDA’s regulatory apparatus. While
FDA’s publicity capabilities are formidable, they are not a conclusive solution to the growing problem of
72Dean, supra note 43, at 480 (quoting Letter from J.C. Clark, Chief, Cent. Dist., FDA, to Chiefs, Cent. Dist. Stations,
FDA (Mar. 11, 1942) (F: 040.2 Cooperation With Other Agencies, Gen. Subject Files, 1945, RG 88, NARA-CP)).
73See George J. Annas, Protecting Soldiers from Friendly Fire: The Consent Requirement for Using Investigational Drugs
and Vaccines in Combat, 24 Am. J. L. and Med. 245, 258 (1997) (The U.S. military is interested in the possible combat-related
use of approximately twenty vaccines which are currently investigational.) (citing Joint Program Oﬃce for Biological Defense,
U.S. Dep’t of Army, Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Assessment (June 1997)).
25systematic regulatory deference to the military’s desire for unfettered access to experimental technologies.
As Viking rulers learned a millennium ago, the use of performance enhancing drugs in combat can be a
double-edged sword. Today, oﬃcials at all levels of the federal government—administrators, legislators,
the President, and his cabinet—need to take an honest look at the potential risks and rewards of current
initiatives in military pharmacology and develop the regulatory tools that will guide our military performance
enhancement policy in the future, for the good of all Americans, whether or not they wear a uniform.
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